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CRIMINAL VICTIM COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND
In recent years considerable attention has been directed toward
the procedural rights of the criminal,' but "one of the most neglected
subjects in the study of crime is its victims .. ."2 One commentator
attributes this neglect to a lack of organization among victims of
crime; the comparison to the cohesiveness of such politically influential groups as workmen and veterans 3 is striking. The relief and
benefit programs afforded by the public to the latter logically would
seem to call for relief to crime victims.
158. A plan which would remedy many unclear portions of the Act has already
been submitted for approval. See J. Capper, An Implementation Plan for the [Maryland] Department of Natural Resources (June 24, 1970).
1. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE

(1967)

REPORT:

CRIME AND ITS

IMPACT -

AN ASSESSMENT

80

[hereinafter referred to as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT].
3. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rzv. 444, 448 (1964).
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Victims of crime suffer in a variety of ways. They may experience personal. injury, property damage, loss of earnings due to incapacity, emotional distress, or family hardship. The need for victim
compensation is accentuated by great increases in the numbers of
offenses of all types.' The cost of crimes against the person alone is
staggering. For example, the estimated economic loss from wilful
homicide is $750,000,000. This figure takes into account both the
economic loss of a productive worker to the community and the loss
5
of a source of income to the victim's family and dependents. Although
the victim has a cause of action in tort against the criminal offender,
in many instances this remedy is illusory.6 There will be no one to
sue if the offender has not been identified or apprehended.7 If there
is a defendant, the victim may be unable to afford the expense of
litigation. 8 Even if these barriers to litigation are surmounted, the
result may be a Pyrrhic victory: the criminal offender is often in
poor financial condition and has no appreciable assets.' (The state
is partially responsible for this since imprisonment of the offender
prevents him from earning money which could help compensate the
victim.' 0 ) For these reasons victim compensation, if it is to be
effected at all, must be derived from other sources.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss various alternatives
available to a victim seeking relief from sources other than the criminal offender himself. These sources are, of necessity, public in nature;
special emphasis is placed on those alternatives available in Maryland.
This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, but is instead designed to give the practicing attorney an overview of victim compensation.
There are two theories upon which the victim of crime may obtain compensation from the government." The first lies in tort,
founded upon the government's negligent failure to provide the victim
protection against crime. This approach has been notably unsuccessful in producing relief, despite certain boosts it has received from
state statutes. The second rests upon a welfare theory: persons vic4. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 40. This study showed that
the rate of victimization for certain indexed crimes (wilful homicide, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) is two percent
in a national survey and increases to from ten percent to twenty percent in individual
districts in certain cities.

5.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

9.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

45.

6. See Yarborough, S. 2155 of the Eighty-Ninth Congress - The Criminal
Injuries Compensation Act, 50 MINN. L. REv. 255, 256 (1965).
7. For example, on the average only forty percent of homicide offenders were
ultimately convicted or sent to juvenile court. Yet where the victim was acquainted
with and could identify the offender, ninety percent oi the homicides were "solved."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 37.
8. Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MINN.
L. REv. 223, 240 (1965). A study of victimization rates shows that victims of violent
crimes are concentrated in the lowest income group and that the rates decrease at
higher income levels. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 80, Table 11.

at 240.

83; Wolfgang, supra note 8,

10.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

11.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

83; Childres, Compensa-

tion for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 444, 456 (1964).
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timized by crime should receive public aid. 2 This latter approach
is a more recent development and promises to be more beneficial to
the criminal victim.
I.

THE TORT THEORY

At common law the basis for a victim's tort suit against the government is the latter's negligent failure to provide proper police protection. The primary obstacle to the establishment of common law
state liability is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, founded on the
English belief that "the King can do no wrong."' 3 "When the individual sovereign was replaced by the broader conception of the
modern state, the idea was carried over that to allow a suit against
a ruling government without its consent was inconsistent with the
very idea of supreme executive power."' 4 In Maryland, as elsewhere,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects not only the State, but
also its municipalities, agencies, and instrumentalities.' 5
Several reasons have been advanced for raising the doctrine as a
defense to an individual's suit against the state, its municipality or
agency. Immunity is based on the public policy argument that an
entire people's committing an unlawful act is an absurdity, on the
theory that a state employee committing a tort is acting outside his
scope of authority, and on the policy that public funds should not
be used to compensate private injuries."' More practical reasons for
applying the doctrine are a desire to avoid the tax consequences .7 and
a fear of hampering the executive and his administrators in the performance of their duties.'
Sovereign immunity only protects the state in its performance
of a "governmental function"; when the state performs a "proprietary
function," it may be held liable for its negligence. 9 The proprietary
function (sometimes called the "private" or "corporate" function)
12. Id.
13. This concept was first found in Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100
Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
14. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 125, at 997 (3d ed. 1964).
15. E.g., Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 334, 260 A.2d 295, 299 (1970).
For a general review of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Maryland, see Clarke,
Municipal Responsibility in Tort in Maryland, 3 MD. L. REv. 159 (1939).

See Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363,
1365 (1954). This article surveys all the states (except Alaska and Hawaii) with
respect to their view on sovereign immunity and notes to what extent statutes have
been passed permitting suit. See also Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort
Liability, 4 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351 (1957).
16. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 125, at 1001 (3d ed. 1964), cited in Godwin v.
County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 332, 260 A.2d 295, 298 (1970), which also states that
immunity is not based on an obsolete theory so much as on the "practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends." Id. at 334, 260 A.2d at 299, quoting Cox v. Anne Arundel County,
181 Md. 428, 431, 31 A.2d 179, 181 (1943).
17. See Mayor & City Council v. State ex rel. Ahrens, 168 Md. 619, 628, 179 A.
169, 173 (1935).

18. Mayor & City Council v. State ex tel. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 271, 195 A. 571,

573-74 (1937).
19. See, e.g., Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 334, 260 A.2d 295, 299
(1970) ; W. PROSSER, TORTS § 125, at 1004-10 (3d ed. 1964); Clarke, Munieipat
Responsibility in Tort in Maryland, 3 MD. L. REv. 159, 160 (1939) ; Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1363, 1366 (1954).
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has been defined as a service performed by the city which could just
as well have been provided by a private corporation and for which
the city collects revenue.20 Examples of proprietary functions for the
negligent performance of which a municipality or agency has been held
liable are the operation of public markets, 21 the removal of ashes and
household refuse, 22 and the maintenance and repair of public highways.2 3 A governmental function has been defined as an act which
is "sanctioned by legislative authority, is solely for the public benefit,
with no profit or emolument inuring to the municipality, and tends
to benefit the public health and promote the welfare of the whole
public, and has in it no element of private interest ....-2' Examples
and operation of pubof governmental functions are the maintenance
27
26
lic parks,"6 schools, and public buildings.

The distinction between proprietary and governmental functions,
with its effect on the attachment of public liability, is difficult to
justify and has been criticized by the law reviews 2 and occasionally
by the courts.' Nevertheless, the distinction continues to be made,
and the labeling of functions as "governmental" leaves injured persons without a remedy.
In nearly all jurisdictions sovereign immunity prevents a victim
from suing the municipality or the state for police misfeasance or nonfeasance; police protection is considered a governmental function."0
There are several grounds for this characterization: police protection
is prescribed by general law, is for the benefit of the public at large,
and is provided as a necessity by the government."'
Maryland law is in accord with this prevailing view, the leading
case being Wynkoop v. Mayor & City Council." In that case a
husband had become intoxicated and irresponsible and had assaulted
his wife. The husband reached for a revolver in order to further
harm his wife. His son intervened and grabbed the revolver, left
the home, and called the police. When a policeman arrived, both son
and mother pleaded with him to confiscate the revolver in order to
prevent further trouble. The officer instead left the gun at the home,
within the husband's reach. The wife later went to the police station
where her appeals were again unavailing. The husband took the
revolver; while roaming the streets, he entered the plaintiff's premises
20. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 125, at 1004, 1007 (3d ed. 1964).
21. See Reed v. Mayor & City Council, 171 Md. 115, 188 A. 15 (1936).
22. See Consolidated Apartment House Co. v. Mayor & City Council, 131 Md.
523, 102 A. 920 (1917).
23. See Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 260 A.2d 295 (1970).
24. Mayor & City Council v. State ex rtl. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 276, 195 A. 571,
576 (1937).
25. Mayor & City Council v. State ex rel.Ahrens, 168 Md. 619, 179 A. 169 (1935).
26. Gold v. Mayor & City Council, 137 Md. 335, 112 A. 588 (1921).
27. County Comm'rs v. Love, 173 Md. 429, 196 A. 122 (1938).
28. See, e.g., Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1363, 1366 (1954).
29. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council v. State ex rel. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 272,
195 A. 571, 574 (1937) ; Mayor & City Council v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128, 136, 173 A. 56,

60 (1934).
30. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34
31. Id. at 240-41.
32. 159 Md. 194, 150 A. 447 (1930).

YALE

L.J. 229, 240 (1925).
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and shot him. The plaintiff sued the municipality on a negligence
theory; the court sustained the municipality's demurrer to the complaint, holding that:
The protection of the citizen against pestilence, disease, violence,
or disorder is essentially a governmental function to be exercised
by the state under its police power, through proper agents. And
while in many cases it is difficult on the facts to mark the boundary between acts and duties which are in their essence governmental, and those which are of a corporate or municipal nature,
that doubt does not exist in respect to the duties of agencies
-harged with the administration of the criminal laws, the conservation of the public peace, or the protection of the citizens
from violence. But the acts of such agencies done in the performance of duties imposed upon them by law are almost everywhere regarded as governmental in their nature, and for the
benefit of the entire public.8"
Thus it is firmly established in Maryland that police protection
is a governmental function and that, therefore, sovereign immunity
attaches.8 4
An exception to placing police functions firmly within the doctrine of sovereign immunity is New York, which has virtually eliminated the defense by waiving immunity in section eight of its Court
of Claims Act.35 As a result of that waiver, New York courts can
entertain ordinary negligence suits against the governmental unit
33. Id. at 201, 150 A. at 450.
34. See State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Baltimore County, 218 Md. 271, 146 A.2d 28
(1958), where the plaintiff was fatally shot by a police officer without justification.
In sustaining the county's demurrer, the court stated that it was the legislature's
function, and not the court's, to enlarge the liability of municipal corporations. Id. at
273, 146 A.2d at 29.
An action against the individual state or municipal officer is subject to the
defense of sovereign immunity where he was performing a governmental function. He
is not liable for mere negligence, although he may be liable if malice is proven. Where
there is malice, the official is deemed to have acted outside the scope of his authority;
in that case the state itself will not be liable. See Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271,
170 A.2d 220 (1961) (prison warden not liable for mere negligence of prison guard
in closing a cell door on prisoner) ; State ex rel. Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 151
A.2d 137 (1959) (superintendent of reformatory not liable for alleged negligence in
allowing the relator to be killed by another inmate) ; State ex rel. Brooks v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co., 147 Md. 194, 127 A. 758 (1925) (sheriff's malicious conduct would
render him liable, but the surety of the sheriff's bond is not liable since such malicious
conduct is outside the scope of the sheriff's official duty); State ex el. Cocking v.
Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 A. 104 (1898) (sheriff not liable for negligently allowing a
mob to lynch one of his prisoners). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 4 (1969),
pertaining to the Maryland State Police: "(a) The Superintendent, the deputy
superintendent, and employees designated by the Superintendent as police employees
shall have throughout the State the same powers, privileges and immunities, and
defenses as sheriffs, constables, police officers, and other peace officers possessed at
common law .... (Emphasis added.) MD. ANN. CoDE art. 65, § 52 (1968) grants
similar immunity to members of the State militia.
35. N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963): "The state hereby waives its
immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have
the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions
in the supreme court against individuals or corporations .. " The Act has also been
applied to municipalities on the theory that their immunity is merely derived from
that of the State. See Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d
604 (1945).
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alleged to be at fault.8" The leading New York case involving negligent police protection is Schuster v. City of New York. 7 In that
case the plaintiff's intestate, Schuster, recognized a notorious escaped
criminal, Willie "The Actor" Sutton, and notified the police. After
the police had arrested Sutton, publicly acknowledging Shuster's role
in the apprehension, Schuster and his family received several anonymous threats. After notifying the police of these threats, Schuster
was given limited police protection at his home and place of business;
this protection was later suspended. He was subsequently shot and
killed on a public street. The court held the municipality liable for
negligently failing to exercise reasonable care once it had actively
proceeded to protect the informer."8
The Schuster court placed great emphasis on the special relationship between the police and the informer which was created by
their collaboration in the apprehension of the criminal.8 " Even New
York, which has removed the sovereign immunity defense as a bar
to actions founded in negligent police protection, is itself reluctant
to find the requisite negligence in the absence of such a special relationship. In Riss v. City of New York,4" the plaintiff had been terrorized for six months by a rejected suitor. She pleaded for police
protection, but her numerous requests were received with indifference.
When she became engaged to another man. the plaintiff received the
most threatening call; she again begged the police for help but was
refused. On the next day a thug hired by the rejected suitor threw
lye in her face. The trial court dismissed the complaint at the conclusion of the defendant's case. In sustaining, the New York Court
of Appeals distinguished the case from Schuster on the ground that
the police had not initially undertaken to protect the plaintiff."' The
court feared that to hold the city negligent for every failure to respond
to an individual's request for police protection would seriously burden
already limited police resources.4" It is apparent that the court will
more readily find negligence in cases of misfeasance (where the police
have actively undertaken to provide protection but have ultimately
failed) as compared to instances of nonfeasance (where no active
36. See Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rzy. 1363,
1391 (1954).
37. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958), discussed in Comment, Municipality Liable for Negligent Failure to Protect Informer: The Schuster
Case, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 487 (1959).
38. The Schuster court relied on the rationale of Judge Cardozo in H.R. Moch
Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 167, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928): "If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury,
there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward." 5 N.Y.2d at 82,
154 N.E.2d at 538, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (1958).
39. 5 N.Y.2d at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269. See also Municipality Liable, supra note 37, at 501-02.
40. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968), affirming 27 App.
Div. 2d 217, 278 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1967), noted in 15 WAYNE L. Rv. 1643 (1969).
41. 22 N.Y.2d at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
42. Id. at 582, 240 N.E.2d at 860-61, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99. The dissent argued
that this fear of financial disaster is a myth, alluding to the fact that the municipality
has not gone bankrupt in paying other tort claims for which it is held liable. Id. at
585, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
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measures of protection have been initiated) . 3 It is further apparent from the Riss decision that a victim's common law tort action
against the government will be of little value, even where, as in
New York, there has been the broadest statutory consent to suit.
What, then, can a victim expect in Maryland, which has several
statutes which, to a more limited extent, waive the sovereign immunity defense.
The Maryland legislature recently enacted sections 60-70 of
article 41 of the Maryland Annotated Code.14 by which wrongful
actions of "special policemen" may render such policemen and the
requesting authority responsible. 45 By the terms of this statute the
governor may appoint a special policeman upon application by any
of the following entities:
(1) Any state, or any subdivision or agency of any state, which
has an interest in property situated wholly or partly in this State;
(2) any municipal, county, or other governmental body of the
State of Maryland for the purpose of protecting any property
owned, leased, or regularly used by the governmental body or
any of its agencies; (3) any college, University or public school
system located in this State for the protection of its property or
students; (4) any firm, corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other entity existing and functioning for a legitimate
and legal business purpose, in order to protect its business
property. 6
The importance of this statute lies in section sixty-nine, which rejects
any defense of sovereign immunity for the acts or omissions of a
special policeman requested by a state, municipality or subdivision.
The previous special police statute4 7 specifically held these governmental bodies immune 4from
liability for the special policeman's mis8
feasance or nonfeasance.

As the New York cases indicate, the loss of the sovereign immunity defense does not lead automatically to recoveries by the victims of crimes against the governmental body charged with a duty
to prevent criminal conduct. The victim still must establish that the
defendant body was negligent, proof of which entails a showing of
both duty and its breach. Depending upon the Maryland courts'
liberal or conservative approach to this duty question, it will be relatively easy or difficult for the victim to establish his cause of action.
There are no reported cases in which a governmental body has been
alleged to be liable on the basis of the amended special police statute.
Nor are there any reported cases under the previous statute. There
is, however, a line of relevant cases which deals with the liabilities
of special police who were appointed to protect corporate property
43. In instances of inaction or nonfeasance, no liability will attach since no duty
to the victim has arisen which can be breached.
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 60-70 (Supp. 1969).
45. Id. at § 64.
46. Id. at § 63.
47. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 60-70 (1965).
48. Id. at § 66.
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pursuant to a statute49 which was repealed by the enactment of the
amended special police statute.5" The repealed statute specifically provided that the requesting corporation or individual was liable for any
wrongful or negligent act of the appointed special policeman. 1
Several cases interpreting this provision permitted victims of
criminal and tortious acts of a special policeman to recover from the
requesting corporation. In Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Deck52 and "olchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Scharnagl5 3 the key issue was
whether the special policemen were acting within the scope of their
employment so as to render the requesting corporations liable to the
plaintiff victims who were shot and assaulted, respectively. In both
cases the court upheld jury verdicts for the plaintiff, finding sufficient
evidence that the special policemen were acting under the orders and
regulations established by the corporations in order to protect their
property.5 4 Even stronger support for the relief of the victim is to
be found in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Strube,5 5 where the court stated,
"If [the special policeman] was acting within the scope of his employment in making the arrest, the defendant would be responsible
even if [the special policeman] acted maliciously or wilfully in committing the assault, because the whole occurrence was one transaction." 56
The significance of these cases lies in an assumption that the
Maryland courts will apply the same liberal interpretation of scope
of employment to cases where governmental bodies request special
police in accordance with the recently amended statute. That they
should is supported by two lines of reasoning. First, and foremost,
the statute specifically waives governmental immunity for wrongful
acts and omissions of the appointed special police;57 and, therefore,
49. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 342-48 (1966).
50. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 60-70 (Supp. 1969). Section 63(4) now provides
for the appointment of special police to protect corporate and other business property.
The business may request this protection, whereas the prior statute only allowed
requests by governmental authorities.
51. MD. ANN. CODE art 23, § 348 (1966).
52. 102 Md. 669, 62 A. 958 (1906), affirming 100 Md. 168, 59 A. 650 (1905).
53. 105 Md. 199, 65 A. 916 (1907).
54. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Deck, 102 Md. 669, 675, 62 A. 958, 961 (1906);
Tolchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Scharnagl, 105 Md. 199, 210, 65 A. 916, 917
(1907). Cf. Tolchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Steinmeier, 72 Md. 313, 20 A. 188
(1890), where the corporation was held not liable for assault and false imprisonment
because its superintendent acted beyond the scope of his authority in ordering the
special policeman to arrest the plaintiff. The court in Steinmeier also stressed the
fact that the plaintiff was arrested away from the corporation's premises; therefore,
the act was not done for the preservation of defendant's property. Id. at 319, 20 A.
at 190. See also Baltimore C. & A. Ry. v. Ennalls, 108 Md. 75, 69 A. 638 (1908).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 64 (Supp. 1969) now holds the requesting authority
responsible for "wrongful actions committed by [the special policeman] in the course
of his duties as well as any abuse of powers granted by the commission either on or
off the premises." (Emphasis added.)
55. 111 Md. 119, 73 A. 697 (1909).
56. Id. at 127-28, 73 A. at 700.
57. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 64, 69 (Supp. 1969). For an example of liability
for nonfeasance by a special policeman, see Bass v. City of New York, 305 N.Y.S2d
801 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Here the New York City Housing Authority exercised its
authority to maintain a special police force to protect inhabitants of one of its housing

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXX

ordinary tort and agency law should apply. Second, in common law
terminology, the purpose of the special police could be classified as
serving a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Supplying special police to protect particular property is not the type of
activity which can only be performed by the general government.
There are numerous private agencies which can provide the same
type of service. Furthermore, the service is not for the benefit of the
general public, but only for the benefit of those empowered to request
the use of special policemen. Therefore, if in the absence of such a
statute the defense of sovereign immunity is questionable, the enactment of a statute specifically waiving such immunity should encourage
the courts to liberally construe the facts of each case in order to grant
relief to the victim.
The Maryland legislature has also abolished the defense of sovereign immunity in two very limited situations involving motor vehicles. The State and its municipalities are liable by statute for
damages or injuries caused by the negligence of one of their policemen where he has directed a motor vehicle operator to help enforce
the law or apprehend a violator thereof." The State or municipality
is also liable for damages or injuries sustained by a motor vehicle
operator when participating in a road block. 9 The government's
willingness to be sued in these situations can be viewed as compensation for services rendered. This generosity is not substantial, however. Cases of soliciting private aid are rare, and a recent statutory
amendment prohibits a police officer from directing the operator,

owner, or passenger of any motor vehicle to participate in a roadblock.6" In view of the amendment, an officer's directing one to
participate in a roadblock will probably be deemed to be an act beyond the scope of his authority so as to preclude recovery under the
preceding section.
In view of recent civil disorders, a potentially important remedy
for victims may be found in Maryland's Riot Statute," which permits
the victim of a riot to recover, in certain situations, full property

damages from the county, incorporated town, or city within whose
jurisdiction the riot occurred.

2

Similar riot or mob violence statutes

projects rather than utilizing the regular police. The victim, a nine-year-old girl, was
raped and murdered on the premises while the one policeman on duty was at lunch.
The City Housing Authority was held liable to her estate for its failure to provide
adequate special police protection.
58. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66/2, §180(a) (1967).
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 180(b) (1967). Under both sections 180(a)
and 180(b) the policeman must have been acting within the scope of his authority, and the defenses of contributory negligence and last clear chance are available to the State or political subdivision. However, it is important to note that,
unlike section 180(a), the motor vehicle operator, for purposes of section 180(b),
need not prove that his injuries or damages resulted from the policeman's negligence.
Thus, in the absence of the enumerated affirmative defenses, this statute imposes strict
liability on the State or political subdivision.
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66Y2, § 180(c) (Supp. 1969).
61. MD. ANN. CODE art. 82 (1965).
62. Id. at § 1. Presumably, the responsibility of these governmental bodies is
concurrent.
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exist in many jurisdictions;63 they are descendants of the English
Riot Act of 1714.4
Originally, riot statutes were enacted as a deterrent to rioters,
the theory being that public or governmental compensation to riot
victims would result in such an increase in taxation that the taxpayer's inclination to riot would be dampened." It was further felt
that these tax consequences would encourage innocent citizens to suppress or prevent riots. 6 When viewed in the context of the massive,
racially-oriented riots which recently have occurred in American
cities, such considerations seem quaint indeed. Present day rioters
are generally low-income ghetto residents6 7 who do not own property,
and who, therefore, are little concerned with the tax consequences
of their actions."8 Moreover, the non-rioters who, by their proximity
to the activity, are in the "best" position to suppress the riots are
from precisely the same ghetto neighborhoods and have a similar
lack of pecuniary interest in possible governmental liability for the
riot. 9 Of course, these citizens may have an interest in protecting
their property and neighborhood; but they are afraid of the mob and
feel that the responsibility for controlling civil disorders rests with
70
the police, not with themselves.
While the original theory behind the riot statues is no longer
applicable, the need for compensation by the government is more
pressing than ever. As mentioned earlier, 7 ' a victim's civil remedy
against his criminal offender is often illusory. Nowhere is this truer
than in the case of a riot victim. The rioter, usually having a low
income, furnishes no source of compensation for the victim. Moreover, since it is extremely difficult even to identify individual rioters,
a determination of which rioter caused the particular damage involved
is virtually impossible.7 2 To compound the compensation problem,
merchants and other property owners in riot-prone areas have great
difficulty in obtaining adequate insurance. Thus public compensation
may be the only way "to spread the burden of injury .... 73
63. For a survey of each state's statutes, see Comment, The Aftermath of the
Riot: Balancing the Budget, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 649 (1968). See generally 33 ALBANY
L. REV. 582 (1969); 68 COLUM. L. REv. 57 (1968); 81 HARV. L. REv. 653 (1968).
64. 1 Geo. 1 Stat 2c. 5 (1714). See 33 ALBANY L. REV. 582, 583 (1969). Cf.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 229, 256-57 (1925).
65. See 33 ALBANY L. REV. 582, 583 (1969).
66. See The Aftermath of the Riot, supra note 63, at 691.
67. A study of self-reporting rioters in Detroit and Newark indicated that many
were unemployed; approximately one-third earned less than $5,000; and less than

nine percent earned in excess of $10,000. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 75 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION].

68. See The Aftermath of the Riot, supra note 63, at 691.
69. Id. The typical rioter in the summer of 1967 was economically in the same

position as his neighboring non-rioter.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION

73.

70. The Aftermath of the Riot, supra note 63, at 691.
71. See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.
72. See Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, 98 Ohio St. 73, 76, 120 N.E
207, 208 (1918); 68 COLUM. L. REV. 57, 68 n.99 (1968).
73. The Aftermath of the Riot, supra note 63, at 689.
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Although there are cases pending which grew out of the Baltimore riots of 1968, 7 4 the only reported cases involving Maryland's
Riot Act7 were concerned with disturbances precipitated by the Civil
War. The first such case was Mayor & City Council v. Poultney;"
there rioters damaged and looted the plaintiff's store in order to obtain guns and ammunition to meet oncoming Union troops. The importance of the case lies in the court's approval of instructions listing the necessary elements for recovery under the Riot Act. The
victim must prove that:
(1) Property and goods were damaged as a result of a riot or
tumultous assemblage too strong to be resisted without the aid
of city authorities; and
(2)

The city had notice of the riot in time to prevent it; and

(3) The city had the ability by themselves, or with the aid of
the citizens, to prevent the riot; and
(4) The city did not use reasonable diligence in preventing or
suppressing the riot."
The court further approved an instruction that, if the city is held
liable, it must compensate the plaintiff for the full amount of any
damage to his real property or goods damaged or looted as a result
of the riot.7 8 Similar instructions were affirmed in Mayor & City
Council v. Dechert,79 which additionally discussed the responsibility
of city authorities to exercise their power to prevent and suppress
riots. 80
It should be noted that recovery under the Riot Act is for property damage only and not for personal injuries; however, property
damage alone from recent riots ran into millions of dollars."' Because
74. See Baltimore Evening Sun, Aug. 13, 1970, § C, at 2, cols. 1 & 2, which
states in part:
In a series of decisions in four test cases, the judge [Charles D. Harris of
the Supreme Bench] yesterday knocked down the city's defenses against liability
for the riot destruction [resulting from the April 1, 1968 riots].
About 150 Superior Court suits claiming more than $5 million in damages
will be affected by the ruling.
The city disclaimed liability by asserting that the Police Department is a
state agency. Judge Harris replied that the City Charter gives the mayor "powers
of a conservator of the peace."
The city does not need to have control over the police force in order to have
the ability to prevent or suppress riots, the judge ruled.
However, the judge said, whether the city used or failed to use its powers is
a matter of evidence "to be decided at the trial of these cases."
The governor's proclamation of a state of emergency, bringing the intervention
of National Guard and federal troops, "might possibly affect the mitigation of any
damages awarded at trial" but should not cause the suits to be dismissed before
trial, Judge Harris said.
75. MD. ANN. CODE art. 82 (1969).
76. 25 Md. 107 (1866).
77. Id. at 107.
78. Id. at 108.
79. 32 Md. 369 (1870).
80. Id. at 386. See also Mayor & City Council v. Sehner, 37 Md. 180, 195 (1872).
81. See 33 ALBANY L. REV. 582, 586 (1969). In the Detroit riots property damage
alone was estimated at $40-$50 million. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION 66.
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of these tremendous potential damages, courts may be reluctant to
find the city negligent in failing to prevent and suppress riots. "When
a large portion of municipal finance is directed toward social welfare
programs and essential city services such as police and fire protection,
it would be an almost impossible burden for many cities, were they
to be held accountable for the total damage resulting from a riot." 2
Even in the absence of court resistance, it would be difficult to
prove negligence, i.e., that the city had the requisite ability to prevent
or suppress the riot 3 and that it failed to use "all reasonable diligence
and all the powers entrusted to [it] for the prevention or suppression
of such riotous or unlawful assemblages." 4 It is generally believed
that most cities do not have sufficient police power to prevent a sudden
large riot.s5 This alone could be viewed as a breach of duty by
the city. However, such a breach is more of a moral rather than
a negligent breach since the city's financial resources limit the size
of the police force. Even if the city did have the requisite power,
the standard of "reasonable diligence" is difficult to apply to modern
riots. In considering what constitutes reasonable diligence in suppressing riotous conduct, the courts must weigh the social causes of
the riot and decide to what extent force is appropriate to put down
the disorder; they must consider what the repercussions of such force
would be. If the city elects not to use force for fear of further aggravating the riot, there would seem to be a corresponding duty to
the potential victims of the riot to employ other peaceful means of
protecting their property. For example, even if the police have orders
not to shoot rioters, the mere presence of a policeman in front of
one's property is often sufficient to deter the rioters from looting that
person's property. Yet this assumes the city's capability of utilizing
a great number of policemen in the riot area without seriously impairing the police protection in other areas of the city. The weighing
of such factors are "traditionally alien to judicial evaluation because
of their inherently political character." 8 In view of the judiciary's
reluctance to decide political problems, it is questionable whether the
riot victims
will be able to recover against the city under the Riot
87
Act.
Furthermore, "[retail businesses suffered a much larger proportion of the damage'
during the disorders than public institutions, industrial property, or private residences." Id. at 67.
82. 33 ALBANY L. REv. 582. 586 (1969).
83. MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, § 2 (1969) provides that:
No such liability shall be incurred . . . unless the authorities shall have good

reason to believe that such a riot or tumultuous assemblage was about to take
place, or having taken place, shall have had notice of the same in time to prevent
said injury or destruction, either by its own police or with the aid of the
citizens .

. . , it

being the intention of this article that no such liability shall devolve

on such county, town, or city unless the authorities having notice have also the

ability of themselves, or with their own citizens to prevent such injury.
(Emphasis added.)
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, § 3 (1969).
85. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION 173-74.
86. The Aftermath of the Riot, supra note 63, at 663.
87. Perhaps the only feasible source of compensation is the federal government;
it might amend the Disaster Relief Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1855 (1964), to include riots in
the definition of "Major Disaster." This is urged by the NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION 197. Yet a sweeping revision of this Act, the Disaster Relief Act of 1969,
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Perhaps a better approach would be to eliminate the requirement of negligence from the Riot Act and to base compensation on a
welfare theory. This approach would have several advantages over
the present negligence system. In addition to eliminating the time
and expense of litigating the negligence issue, the welfare approach
would alleviate a municipality's fear of the bankruptcy which could
result from the imposition of full liability under the present statute
by limiting the amount of compensation to be paid the riot victims.
While the victims would still suffer a net loss from the riot damage,
limited compensation would be better than none, the result if a court
fails to find the negligence required by the present statute. To minimize the possibility of a resulting tax increase to the entire populace,
recovery could be given only to those who had contributed a certain
sim of money annually, in effect purchasing riot insurance from the
municipality.
II.

WELFARE THEORY

Recognizing the hardship faced by victims of all types who do
not possess an adequate civil remedy, some states and municipalities
have recently passed statutes which provide relief to such victims
without requiring them to bear the burden of proof required in civil
suits. Maryland has several statutes in this category, one such being
the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund.88 While this law applies
to cases against uninsured motorists in general, it is relevant to this
discussion because of its provisions protecting one who is the victim
of a hit-and-run accident,89 which is a crime in Maryland.9 ° Such a
victim can sue the Board of Motor Vehicles when the identity of the
offender is unknown and cannot be ascertained," even if the victim
hopes eventually to sue the owner or operator.9 2 Thus, if the hit-andrun victim is insured" and cannot locate or ascertain the offender,
the State will compensate
him or his representative for his personal
4
injury or death.

The most important source of public compensation for the victim
of a criminal act is the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, 5 enPubl. L. No. 91-79, 83 Stat. 125, has failed to include riots in the definition of "Major
Disaster," a term generally referring to natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods.
88. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66Y2, §§ 150-79 (1967), as amended (Supp. 1969).
89. Id. at §§ 167-71.
90. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66Y2, § 199 (1967).
91. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66Y, § 167(a) (1967), as amended (Supp. 1969), cited
in Tyler v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 252 Md. 39, 248 A.2d 885 (1969).
92. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66Y2, § 167A (Supp. 1969). As to prospective application

of this section, see Melvin v. Rembert, 259 F. Supp. 33 (D. Md. 1966) ; Unsatisfied
Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. Bowman, 249 Md. 705, 241 A.2d 714 (1968).
93. To encourage the carrying of insurance, this statute prohibits recovery by the
victim if "at the time of the accident, [he was] operating or riding in any uninsured
motor vehicle owned by him, [or he is] the personal representative of a person who
was so riding in such a vehicle." MD. ANN. CODE art. 66Y, §§ 167(c), 167A(2)
(Supp. 1969).
94. See MD. ANN. CoDE art. 66Y, § 162, as amended (Supp. 1969) for amount of

recovery allowed.
95. MD. ANN. ConE art. 26A (Supp. 1969).
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acted by the Maryland legislature in 1968.9"

This statute permits

unreimbursed victims of crime to be compensated by the State for

personal injuries and loss of earnings if the victim would otherwise
suffer serious financial hardship.
The movement towards public compensation programs, while
achieving real momentum only in the last decade, actually dates back

to the Code of Hammurabi, under which victims of robberies were
compensated by the city.0 7 The first successful contemporary victim
compensation program was enacted by New Zealand in 1963 ;a8 it
was followed by one in Great Britain in 1964."0 In this country,
California was the first state to adopt such a program in 1965,00
followed by New York in 1966.1°1

There are several reasons underlying these programs. As mentioned, a victim's civil remedy is often inadequate. The state has an
economic motive in preventing the burden which an incapacitated or
destitute member presents to the rest of society."0 2 Moreover, these
victims are generally injured through no fault of their own: and,
therefore, many regard it a moral obligation to aid them.' 0 3 While
public compensation programs do not rest on a theory of negligence,
they nevertheless "suggest that state authorities conceded an inability
to ameliorate to any great degree the threat of violent crime, and that
they assume as public burden the consequences of such crime."'0 4
The mechanics and scope of the Maryland Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act may best be understood by examining certain

96. Ch. 455, [1968] Md. Laws 803.
97. Sections 22-24 of the CODE OF HAMMURABI (about 2250 B.C.) provide:
If a man practice brigandage and be captured, that man shall be put to death.
If the brigand be not captured, the man who has been robbed, shall, in the
presence of God, make an itemized statement of his loss, and the city and the
governor, in whose province and jurisdiction the robbery was committed, shall
compensate him for whatever he lost. If it be a life [that was lost], the city and
governor shall pay one mina of silver to his heirs.
30 ALBANY L. Rav. 325 n.1 (1966). The Code's aim was not a welfare one; it was
designed to encourage a city to apprehend criminals. Id. at 325.
98. Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, Act. No. 134 of 1963 (N.Z.)
99. COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CMD. No. 2323 (1964).

100. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 11211 (West 1966), repealed and amended by
CAL. GOVT CODE § 13960 (West Supp. 1970).
101. N.Y. Exac. LAW art. 22, §§ 620-35 (McKinney Supp. 1969). See also
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, §§ 1-7 (1968).

102. See Geist, State Compensation to Victims of Violent Crime, PRESIDENT'S
157.
103. Id. This motive is reflected in Maryland's Criminal Injuries Compensation
Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A (Supp. 1969), in the declaration of policy and legislative intent:
The legislature recognized that many innocent persons suffer personal physical
injury or death as a result of criminal acts or in their efforts to prevent crime
or apprehend persons committing or attempting to commit crimes. Such persons
or their dependents may thereby suffer disability, incur financial hardships or
become dependent upon public assistance. The legislature finds and determines
that there is a need for government financial assistance for such victims of crime.
Accordingly it is the legislature's intent that aid, care and support be provided
by the State, as a matter of moral responsibility, for such victims of crime.
Id. at § 1 (emphasis added).
104. Geist, supra note 102. In fact, the relief made available by such statutes makes
it easier for a court to deny relief to a victim who sues the city or state for alleged
negligent police protection. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 582-83,
240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968). See also Young v. Desert View
Management Corp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 848 (Ct. App. 1969).
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pertinent provisions of the Act. Section 3(a) establishes a three-man
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, appointed by the governor,
to decide the claims of victims ;105 only one Board member need be
a lawyer. (The composition of such boards in other jurisdictions is
disparate: although New York requires that all of its board members
be lawyers,1"' the New Zealand Minister of Justice advocated nonlegal personnel as board members under New Zealand's program,
believing that public confidence would be greater in a board which
decided claims "on the basis of what is fair and reasonable rather
than on the application of strict rules and precedents.' 1 0 7 ) Despite
section 3(a)'s requirement of only one lawyer, all the members appointed to date have been attorneys. s The fear of strict procedural
rules has been alleviated by the informal nature of the Board's hearings, especially the relaxation of common law and statutory rules
of evidence and procedure.' 0 9
Sections 5(a)(1)-(3) provide that not only the victim, but in
the case of his death his surviving spouse, children or other dependents
shall be eligible for awards. This provision apparently stems from
the State's desire to lessen the burden on society by compensating all
of those qualified people affected by the crime. Sections 5(a) (4)-(6)
incorporate a good-samaritan concept by compensating a victim, or
his family and dependents, if the injury or death resulted from apprehending a criminal or attempting to prevent a criminal act." 0 This
reflects a public policy of encouraging citizens to enforce the law
and of insuring that they do not undergo financial hardship because
against the State are discouraged
of such efforts."' Fraudulent claims
2
by two provisions of the Act.1
105. Similar boards are used in the programs in New Zealand, [Act No. 134
of 19631. Great Britain, [CMD. No. 2323 (1964)l and New York fN.Y. Exac. LAW
art. 22, § 622 (McKinney Supp. 1969)]. The other alternative is placing the administration of the act upon the ijdiciarv, as in Massachusetts' program. MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 2 (1968). This latter approach has been criticized because it
places a substantial additional workload on the courts, results in delay in adjudication
of claims, and involves stricter procedural rules than board determinations. See
Floyd, Massachusetts' Plan to Aid Victims of Crime. 48 B.U.L. Rnv. 360, 363 (1968).
106. N.Y. EXEc. LAW art. 22, § 622(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
107. Geist, supra note 102, at 161.
108. Interview with Martin I. Moylan, Executive Director of the Maryland
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, in Baltimore City, Mar. 17, 1970.
109. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD RULES & REGULATIONS, Rules
IV, VI.
110. See also Baltimore City's Good Samaritan Law, BALTIMORE, MD., Ordinance
1085, July 12, 1967, adding new § 110 to BALTIMORE, MD. CODE art. 1 (1966). This
law was passed prior to the enactment of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act
and provided that the State law, when passed, should have precedence. However,
there are two aspects of the Ordinance which are still effective since not covered by
the State statute. A "good-samaritan" victim, under the Ordinance, can recover for
actual property damage as well as for personal injuries of less than $100. Ordinance
1085, §§ l(c)(i), (ii).
111. The same policy appears in the motor vehicle laws. See note 59 supra and
accompanying text.
112. Section 5(b) declares ineligible for award any person responsible for the
crime, the accomplice of such a person, and any member of such person's family; the
State does not wish to compensate a person for his own wrong-doing. Section sixteen
imposes a stiff penalty on anyone asserting a false claim. Such a person is guilty of a
misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not less than $500 or one year imprisonment
or both.
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Section eight provides that each claim is to be decided by a single
Board member,113 but that the claimant may appeal the decision to
the full Board pursuant to section nine. As of March, 1970, there
have been eight such appeals, three of which have resulted in reversal
of the denial of a claim by the single Board member.1 Section ten
permits the State attorney general to seek judicial review if the decision by the full Board is deemed to be improper; in practice, such
review is used to challenge an excessive award.'
The statute does
not expressly allow a claimant to seek judicial review if he thinks the
award is inadequate. Whether a claimant has such a right has not
yet been contested; this right may be available to a claimant under
section 255(a) of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act." 6
Rule XVIII(b) of the Board states that appeals from the Board shall
be governed by the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act. Even
where statutes make no such provision, "Maryland Courts will review allegedly arbitrary agency action ....11117
Section twelve lists several prerequisites to the granting of an
award. Section 12 (a)(2) allows an award only in cases of personal
injury or death,1"' thus excluding compensation for property damage (an approach typical to this type of statute). There are valid
reasons for excluding compensation for property damage: crimes
against property are highly susceptible to fraud; the expense of such
compensation would be prohibitive;19 insurance is available for property; and concern for the man himself is greater than that for his
property.2 0
Section 12(a)(3) requires that the claimant must have reported
the crime to the police within forty-eight hours unless there are extenuating cricumstances. This provision reflects a legislative policy
to aid law enforcement and to encourage the prompt reporting of
crimes to the police.' 2 ' This policy is further reflected by section
12(a) (3)'s denial of award to any claimant who has not fully cooperated with the police.
Relief under the Maryland Criminal Injuries Compensation Act
is not available to all victims of crimes against the person. Section
12(d) provides that no award shall be given to the extent that the
113. The claim is decided "regardless of whether the alleged criminal has been
apprehended or prosecuted for or convicted of any crime based upon the same incident,
or has been acquitted, or found not guilty of the crime in question owing to criminal
responsibility or other legal exemption." MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 8(c) (Supp.
1969).
114. Interview with Executive Director of Board, supra note 108.
115. Id.
116. MD.ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255(a) (1965).
117. Cohen, Some Aspects of Maryland Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. REv. I,

36 (1964).

118. The amount of the award is determined by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Benefit Schedules of MD.ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36 (1964), as amended
(Supp. 1969).
119. The fear of higher taxes resulting from the financing of Maryland's program
was eliminated by charging an additional $5 in court costs in criminal cases. Thus
criminals are financing this program. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 17 (Supp. 1969).
120. Floyd, Victim Compensation Plans, 55 A.B.A.J. 159 (1969).
121. Although some serious crimes are not reported by victims, they are much

more likely to be reported than lesser offenses.
ENFORCEMENT 40.
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victim is already receiving compensation from the criminal himself
or from any other public or private source (such as welfare or insurance). Sections one and 12(f), read together, make it clear that an
award (which is based on out-of-pocket expenses and loss of earnings,
but limited to the amount allowed under the Workmen's Compensation Benefit Schedules) shall only be given to that victim who will
suffer serious financial hardship as a result of his injury. The rules
and regulation of the Board provide that all of the claimant's financial
resources are to be considered in determining serious financial hardship.1 2 However, the following assets of the claimant are exempt
from consideration:
(1)

A homestead;

(2)

Personal property consisting of clothing and strictly personal
effects;

(3)

Tools and equipment necessary for the claimant's trade, occupation or business;

(4) Household furniture, appliances and equipment;
(5)

A family automobile;

(6) Life insurance except in death claims, in the face amount of
$1,000.00 for the claimant and a similar sum of $1,000.00
for the claimant's spouse or each dependent child; and
(7)

Savings in an amount equal to the claimant's annual net
income.128

Generally, claimants will be in the upper-lower or lower-middle class
income brackets since these people are barely able to support themselves and suffer most from the unexpected financial loss which often
attends victimization by crime. 12 4 In particular, the widows and dependents of such deceased victims are prone to suffer serious financial
hardship from the loss of their income producer. 12 5 However, in
view of the exemptions applicable in determining financial hardship,
a victim of more substantial means might also fall within the criterion
of suffering "serious financial
hardship" if his injury results in present
26
inability to earn income.
Although the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board has been
in existence since July 1, 1968, it took almost a year to iron out its
operational problems and to hire claim investigators.' 2 7 As a result,
122. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD RULES & REGULATIONS, Rule XII.
123. Id. at Rule XIII.
124. Interview with Executive Director of Board, supra note 108.
125. See awards granted in claims nos. 7-D-69, 29-D-69, 63-D-69, 69-D-69 (on

file with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board).

126. For example, consider a professional person who owns an expensive, wellfurnished home, an expensive car, and has savings of less than his annual net income.
If being victimized results in a termination of his professional practice, such a claimant
(assuming the absence of any insurance) may well qualify as suffering a serious
financial hardship.
127. See Baltimore Evening Sun, Mar. 23, 1970, § C, at 1, cols. 3-5.
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the Board issued only ten awards (totalling about $20,000) in 1969,
while denying about one hundred and twenty-five claims." 8 Now
that the Board is ready to assume a large workload (and because
of additional publicity as to the availability of this form of compensation), it is anticipated that more victims of crime will file claims
with the Board.
III. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the victim of crime has little, if any, chance
of winning compensation from the state or municipality on a negligence or tort theory. The doctrine of sovereign immunity serves to
bar most common law actions instituted against the government
Even where the government has relaxed the doctrine by statute, the
negligence theory places a difficult burden on the victim; as a consequence, these statutes are often as illusory as the victim's civil remedy
against his offender.
The welfare theory appears to be the best method of assuring
that the victim will be compensated. Although the welfare theory, as
reflected in the Maryland Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, does
not afford relief to all victims, its readily available compensation to
the hardship victim is a most desirable step toward alleviating the
pressing problem of criminal victim compensation.

128. Id. at col. 3. New York, on the other hand, handles almost 2,000 claims

annually. This discrepancy can be attributed to several factors. New York's program does not have the limited manpower that Maryland's has had. Members of
New York's board are full-time employees of the program, whereas Maryland's Board
members work on a part-time basis. Compare N.Y. Exac. LAw art. 22, § 622(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1969) with MD. ANN. CODE art 26A, § 3(d) (Supp. 1969). Due to
the tremendous difference in population, New York would, moreover, be expected to
have more claimants.

